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REGULATING THE SIXTH SENSE: THE GROWING NEED FOR 
FORWARD-LOOKING DATA PRIVACY AND DEVICE 





Although it may not be top-of-mind, many consumers have begun to 
suspect that technology companies may know a little too much about them 
for comfort. Journalist, Dylan Curran, decided to investigate and found that 
Google alone had compiled 5.5 GB1 (approximately 3 million Word 
documents) worth of data containing much more invasive information than 
just his search history. Tech companies use artificial intelligence (AI) to 
scan users’ private emails and continue tracking users’ locations even after 
location settings have been turned off.2 Companies like Comcast might even 
soon be able to monitor customers’ movement patterns in their homes using 
Wi-Fi wave signals.3 Big data is rife with examples of information that 
could be compromised or abused for surveillance purposes, and the data 
                                                   
*   J.D. (2021), Washington University School of Law. 
1.   “This link includes your bookmarks, emails, contacts, your Google Drive files, all of the 
above information, your YouTube videos, the photos you’ve taken on your phone, the businesses you’ve 
bought from, the products you’ve bought through Google . . . They also have data from your calendar, 
your Google hangout sessions, your location history, the music you listen to, the Google books you’ve 
purchased, the Google groups you’re in, the websites you’ve created, the phones you’ve owned, the 
pages you’ve shared, how many steps you walk in a day” Dylan Curran, Are you ready? This is all the 
data Facebook and Google have on you, THE GUARDIAN, (Mar. 30, 2018), 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/mar/28/all-the-data-facebook-google-has-on-you-
privacy [https://perma.cc/BQJ2-UQ2G]. 
2.   Dale Smith, Google collects a frightening amount of data about you. You can find and 
delete it now, CNET (June 28, 2020, 7:18 AM), https://www.cnet.com/how-to/what-google-knows-
about-you-may-be-a-shock-heres-how-to-download-and-manage-or-delete-your-activity/ 
[https://perma.cc/F9YT-XT37]. 
3.   They may also be able to read your lips and identify your visitors simply by assessing how 
Wi-Fi waves bounce off bodies and other objects in houses. Jennifer Miller, Big Data Probably Knows 
More About You Than Your Friends Do, LEAPSMAG (Feb. 5, 2018), https://leapsmag.com/big-data-
probably-knows-friends/ [https://perma.cc/4GPS-WJLL]. In one study, MIT researchers used routers 
and sensors to monitor breathing and heart rates with 99% accuracy. Id.  

















being collected is only becoming more invasive as technology progresses.4 
Devices like smartphones have been tracking users’ daily activities for 
years, but recent advances in health technology are illustrating just how 
personal the data can become.5 Wearable fitness trackers, iPhone’s Health 
application, and direct-to-consumer genetic testing companies are just a few 
examples. Developments like these have drawn their fair share of scrutiny 
regarding privacy and device security,6 and while these concerns continue 
unresolved, even more invasive technology is under development. An 
example of this is brain-computer interfaces (“BCI”), a biotechnology 
theoretically capable of augmenting the human brain.7  
The recent success of Marvel movies such as Avengers: Endgame is a 
testament to society’s infatuation with superheroes, but their heightened 
abilities have always been firmly grounded in science fiction, or so we 
thought.8 Modern science and technology, however, are quickly bringing 
these superhumans much closer to being reality. BCIs, which currently 
allow users to use neural signals to control external device—such as 
prostheses, video games, and word processors—have the potential to be 
used as an elective form of augmenting human brain power.9 Aside from the 
scientific advances necessary to usher in this era of augmentative BCI 
                                                   
4.  See, e.g., Kim Lyons, Amazon’s Ring now reportedly partners with more than 2,000 US 
police and fire departments, THE VERGE (Jan. 31, 2021, 11:26 AM), 
https://www.theverge.com/2021/1/31/22258856/amazon-ring-partners-police-fire-security-privacy-
cameras (“Privacy advocates have raised concerns about how Ring data is used by and made available 
to law enforcement.”); Dan Swinhoe, The 15 biggest data breaches of the 21st century, CSO (Jan. 8, 
2021, 2:00 AM), https://www.csoonline.com/article/2130877/the-biggest-data-breaches-of-the-21st-
century.html [https://perma.cc/3HXX-CUYY].  
5.   See generally Curran, supra note 1 (Google and Facebook can access location data from 
multiples devices, user webcams and microphones, and deleted files and search terms).  
6.   See infra Part II.  
7.   See Jerry J. Shih, Dean J. Krusienski & Jonathan R. Wolpaw, Brain-Computer Interfaces 
in Medicine, 87 MAYO CLIN PROC 268–79 (2012).  
8.   THE WALT DISNEY COMPANY, Marvel Studios’ ‘Avengers Endgame’ Makes History with 
$1.2 Billion Global Debut, THE WALT DISNEY CO. (Apr. 28, 2019), 
https://www.thewaltdisneycompany.com/marvel-studios-avengers-endgame-makes-history-with-1-2-
billion-global-debut/ [https://perma.cc/4BG7-YVNF] (“Marvel Studios’ Avengers: Endgame has 
shattered records with an unprecedented estimated global debut of $1.209 billion, becoming the first 
film in history to surpass $1 billion in its opening weekend.”). 
9.   See Daniel Gomez Ramos, The Future of Brain Computer Interface Technology, IN-
TRAINING (Jan. 22, 2018), https://in-training.org/future-brain-computer-interface-technology-15655 
[https://perma.cc/R27R-Y7ZU] for an alternate definition (“BCI is defined as computer technology that 
can interact with neural structures by decoding and translating information from thoughts (i.e., neuronal 


















usage, 10  the question remains of how to properly regulate the privacy and 
safety concerns accompanying these devices. Additionally, there are 
concerns as to the ethical questions surrounding elective alterations of 
otherwise healthy human minds and bodies.11 Although not yet a subject of 
popularized debate, the ways in which society chooses to address policy 
surrounding BCI could have profound impacts upon the future of 
humanity.12 As one scholar emphasized in comparing BCI to genetic 
enhancements:  
[T]he potential of this technology to change and 
significantly affect humans is potentially far greater than 
that of genetic enhancements, because genetic 
enhancements are inherently limited by biology and the 
single location of an individual, whereas hybrids of human 
and machine are not so restricted.13  
Due to the potential for such transformative impact, it is crucial that 
policymakers carefully consider the regulations necessary to address the 
significant privacy and security risks associated with this emerging 
biotechnology and balance those risks with the interest society may have in 
encouraging innovation in the sector.  
As early as 1998, Kevin Warwick, an Emeritus Professor at Coventry 
and Reading Universities, was experimenting with adding a little 
“something extra” to his natural, biological senses.14 In 2002, he had a 100-
electrode micro-array implanted into his wrist and connected to a radio 
transmitter on his arm.15 He then used an ultrasonic sensor that 
                                                   
10.   For an in-depth analysis of some of the challenges facing researchers, see Eric Chan, The 
Food and Drug Administration and the Future of the Brain-Computer Interface: Adapting FDA Device 
Law to the Challenges of Human-Machine Enhancement, 25 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUT. & INFO. L. 117 
(2007).  
11.   See, e.g., Mark A. Attiah & Martha J. Farah, Minds, motherboards, and money: futurism 
and realism in the neuroethics of BCI technologies, 8 FRONT. SYST. NEUROSCI. 86 (May 15, 2014), 
https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fnsys.2014.00086/full [https://perma.cc/VST9-2JRV]. 
12.   Kevin Warwick, Cyborg morals, cyborg values, cyborg ethics, 5 ETHICS AND INFO. TECH. 
131–37 (2003) (discussing possible hazards such as remote controlling the motions of another 
individual).  
13.   Ellen M. McGee & Gerald Q. Maguire, Becoming borg to become immortal: regulating 
brain implant technologies, 16 CAMBRIDGE QUARTERLY OF HEALTHCARE ETHICS : CQ : THE INT’L J. OF 
HEALTHCARE ETHICS COMMS. 291–302 (2007). 
14.   Warwick, supra note 12, at 135. 
15.   Kevin Warwick, Project Cyborg 2.0, (Oct. 17, 2019), 

















communicated with the implant to navigate a room blindfolded using pulses 
of current to the nerves in his wrist when he was close to an obstacle.16 This 
relatively simple experiment illustrated the potential that neuroelectric 
interfaces (a more rudimentary version of modern brain-computer 
interfaces) could offer in augmenting human senses.17 
Since then, scientists have continued to develop applications of the 
technology for rehabilitative use, and many entrepreneurs have already 
begun to envision a world where BCIs are used electively to enhance 
consumers’ biology. The recent documentary I Am Human explores several 
themes surrounding these developments.18 A Wired article about the 
documentary laid out the possibilities: the ability to see in the dark, a cure 
for depression, direct mind-to-mind communication, and more. 19 
Not only are these possibilities exciting to think about in the abstract, 
they are already being implemented by entrepreneurs like Elon Musk and 
Mark Zuckerberg.20 Neuralink21, founded by serial entrepreneur Elon Musk, 
hopes to eventually be able to offer consumers a host of novel abilities 
including “being able to access and absorb knowledge instantly from the 
cloud or to pump images from one person’s retina straight into the visual 
cortex of another; creating entirely new sensory abilities, from infrared 
eyesight to high-frequency hearing; and ultimately, melding together human 
and artificial intelligence.”22 Musk has spoken about BCI as a tool to help 
                                                   
http://www.kevinwarwick.com/project-cyborg-2-0/ [https://perma.cc/KB2F-BCGA].  
16.   Eben Harrell, My Body, My Laboratory, TIME (Mar. 6, 2011), 
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2050030,00.html [https://perma.cc/QF3M-J7V3]. 
17.   Professor Warwick talks about this experiment on his website. Warwick, supra note 15. 
Interestingly, it is noted that, “. . . Professor Warwick was able to control an electric wheelchair and an 
intelligent artificial hand, developed by Dr Peter Kyberd, using the neural interface. Id. In addition to 
being able to measure the nerve signals transmitted along the nerve fibers in Professor Warwick’s left 
arm, the implant was also able to create artificial sensation by stimulating via individual electrodes 
within the array.” Id.  
18.   I AM HUMAN (Intelligent Films 2019).  
19.   See Aerielle Pardes, Brain-Machine Interfaces Could Give Us All Superpowers, WIRED 
(May 2, 2019), https://www.wired.com/story/i-am-human-brain-implants/ [https://perma.cc/2MRM-
77SW].  
20.   “Those aren't science-fiction scenarios either. Elon Musk and Mark Zuckerberg have 
each invested in brain-computer interfaces to advance human capabilities. Musk's Neuralink aims to 
improve human cognition, to compete with the likes of AI. Zuckerberg's idea is more like a mind-
reading machine. Johnson's startup, Kernel, is working on creating a brain interface that develops 
real world applications of high resolution brain activity.” Id. 
21.   See NEURALINK, https://neuralink.com/ [https://perma.cc/5MRK-BS6V]. 



















balance out the risks posed by highly developed AI technology, which he 
believes will eventually outpace human intelligence and ability.23 
Furthermore, outspoken entrepreneur Bryan Johnson of Kernel sees BCIs 
as an inevitable step in the evolution of humanity in the digital age:24 
Humans currently reign supreme on planet Earth, because 
we are the most powerful form of intelligence. . . . We are 
currently developing a new form of intelligence in the form 
of AI that is increasingly capable, whether it’s conscious or 
not. For humans to be relevant in a matter of decades there 
is no choice other than to unlock our brains and intervene 
in our cognitive evolution. 25 
Although the ideas expressed by these entrepreneurs may sound extreme or 
even unhinged to some, there is no denying that they are drawing 
investments, undergoing research and development in labs, and being 
positioned as a shaping force in society’s future.  
This is typically how emerging technology works. Policy makers often 
lag behind, seemingly chasing after the technology and attempting to course 
correct after the risks to consumers have already manifested themselves.26 
Because of the particularly invasive nature of this technology and its 
profound risk to data privacy and security, it is crucial to develop a 
comprehensive policy framework capable of providing adequate consumer 
protections in the context of highly invasive technology before consumers 
begin adopting it. With that being said, these risks must also be balanced 
                                                   
be-made-to-work-together [https://perma.cc/H2EG-K4HC] [hereinafter Brains and Machines]. See also 
Tim Urban, Neuralink and the Brain’s Magical Future, WAIT BUT WHY (Apr. 20, 2017), 
https://waitbutwhy.com/2017/04/neuralink.html#part6 [https://perma.cc/V2FL-7F2X].  
23.   See Urban, supra note 22. 
24.   Johnson is developing what is described as “a non-invasive mind/body/machine 
interface (MBMI) to improve, evolve and extend human cognition” at his company Kernel. See 
KERNEL, https://kernel.com/ [https://perma.cc/L5SC-CUDN].  
25.   Steven Levy, Why You Will One Day Have a Chip in your Brain, WIRED (July 5, 2017), 
https://www.wired.com/story/why-you-will-one-day-have-a-chip-in-your-brain/ 
[https://perma.cc/C92W-N2N8]. 
26.   Some modern examples of this include Juul and 23andMe data sales. See Ainsley Harris, 
How Juul, founded on a life-saving mission, became the most embattled startup of 2018, FAST COMPANY 
(Nov. 19, 2018), https://www.fastcompany.com/90262821/how-juul-founded-on-a-life-saving-mission-
became-the-most-embattled-startup-of-2018 [https://perma.cc/VU94-RPYD]. See also Henri-Corto 
Stoeklé et al., 23andMe: a new two-sided data-banking market model, BMC MEDICAL ETHICS 17 (2016) 
at 1, 11. 

















with the technology’s potential to enhance the human condition and 
improve users’ lives. Although it can be difficult to fully analyze the 
potential impact of an emerging technology with yet to be realized potential, 
it is important to begin evaluating relevant policy frameworks as soon as 
possible in order to minimize what is seemingly an inevitable lag between 
technology and the law.27 
Part I of this Note will outline the current state of augmentative BCI 
technology, from its origin as a rehabilitative tool developed in medical 
research labs through its journey to market in modern biotech start-ups. Part 
II will discuss the trend of increasingly invasive technology, of which BCI 
is merely one example, and highly personalized data being collected by 
companies. It will also outline current developments in data privacy and 
device security regulation. Finally, Part III will examine proposed policy 
solutions for governing data privacy and device security in a manner that 
will tackle the challenges of BCI and other invasive consumer technologies. 
 
I. BCI RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 
 
Practical applications of BCI technology are often seen in clinical 
settings, seeking to rehabilitate or mitigate the effects of damage to the 
central nervous system.28 Research universities and other neuroscience 
entities have been working on this technology for decades, slowly making 
progress towards a better understanding of neural signals and how to 
leverage them in combination with computer interfaces.29 Advances in BCI 
have been unpredictable and relatively slow (in comparison with the rate of 
progression in other spheres of technology30) due to several developmental 
barriers.31 Like early computers, current BCI has some serious bandwidth 
                                                   
27.   Robin Tricoles, Smart tech sprints forward, but the law lags behind, ARIZ. STATE UNIV. 
(Mar. 21, 2019), https://research.asu.edu/smart-tech-sprints-forward-law-lags-behind 
[https://perma.cc/QY9Y-VK6X] (referencing pacing problem caused by existing laws inability to keep 
up with rapidly developing new technologies).  
28.   See, e.g., Shih et. al., supra note 7.  
29.   See, e.g., Ed Boyden, MIT MCGOVERN INST., https://mcgovern.mit.edu/profile/ed-
boyden/ [https://perma.cc/ZB87-NXBX] (last visited May 24, 2021); Brain Computer Interface, 
CARNEGIE MELLON UNIV.: BIOMEDICAL FUNCTIONAL IMAGING AND MICROENGINEERING LAB, 
https://www.cmu.edu/bme/helab/Research/BCI/index.html [https://perma.cc/DM3L-TPTR] (last 
visited May 24, 2021).  
30.   Urban, supra note 22, at 97–98.  


















limitations because there have never been more than a “couple hundred 
electrodes in the human brain” limiting the number of neurons that can 
simultaneously be recorded.32 It is estimated that the number of neurons that 
can be recorded doubles every 7.4 years.33 This stands in stark contrast to 
computers, where the number of transistors that can fit onto a computer 
chip, increasing computing power, doubles about every 18 months.34 
Additionally, there are problems of implantation methods, biocompatibility, 
and device lifespan.35 Finally, there is significant potential for financial and 
organizational barriers to progress. 36 Thus, the inherently complex nature 
of the technology is one barrier to rapid progress. 
Despite these challenges, when the industry started to draw big names 
like Elon Musk and Facebook, venture capital investments were not far 
behind. For example, in 2016, entrepreneur and Braintree founder, Bryan 
Johnson, invested $100 Million into Kernel to “read and write neural 
code.”37 This influx of capital into the market will certainly help eliminate 
some of the barriers to development. In fact, despite the thresholds that 
remain to be crossed in BCI development, the projected Compound Annual 
Growth Rate (CAGR) for the global BCI market over the next 5 years ranges 
from 12.43% to 14.9%.38 Estimates for market size globally range from 
$283.04 million to up to $1.2 billion by 2025.39 Due to the nature of 
technological advancement and adoption, it is useful to conceptualize BCI 
applications in the near-term—namely rehabilitating patients, piloting non-
                                                   
32.   “When it comes to vision, that equals a super low-res image. When it comes to motor, that 
limits the possibilities to simple commands with little control. When it comes to your thoughts, a few 
hundred electrodes won’t be enough to communicate more than the simplest spelled-out message.” 
Urban, supra note 22 at 97–98. 
33.   Urban, supra note 22. 
34.   Urban, supra note 22.  
35.   Urban, supra note 22.  
36.   Brains and Machines, supra note 22 (“One is financial: the combination of lengthy 
payback periods and deep technology scares off most investors. Another is the need for multidisciplinary 
expertise to get better interfaces built and management skills to keep complex projects on track.”). 
37.   Brains and Machines, supra note 22.   
38.   Global brain computer interface market size 2018 and 2025, STATISTA, 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/1015013/worldwide-brain-computer-interface-market-value/ 
[https://perma.cc/J7QA-B4AH] (last visited Feb. 5, 2020); Brain Computer Interface Market to be 
Worth US$ 1.2 Billion by 2024; Demand Increases with Growing Prevalence of Brain Disorders, 
TRANSPARENCY MKT. RSCH (May 16, 2018, 4:30 AM), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-
releases/brain-computer-interface-market-to-be-worth-us-12-billion-by-2024-demand-increases-with-
growing-prevalence-of-brain-disorders---tmr-682767451.html [https://perma.cc/HA9Y-EE66]. 
39.   TRANSPARENCY MKT. RSCH., supra note 38. 
 

















invasive consumer devices, and beginning human tests with more invasive 
devices—than applications in the long-term. As the technology evolves 
from clinical use to augmentative use, though, several considerations—such 
as more widespread use, parallel developments in AI, and more rapid 
scientific advancement due to funding increases—will make a more 
comprehensive privacy and security policy necessary to encourage the 
safety of the emerging technology while minimizing risks. 
 
A. Near-Term Implementation of BCI 
 
Scientists have already seen a degree of success in implementing 
various BCI (and BCI adjacent technologies) in individuals whose central 
nervous system has been compromised to the extent that their standard 
neural signals are no longer functioning to control certain movements.40 At 
Brown University, a quadriplegic hardwired to a computer with BrainGate41 
was able to beat a reporter at a video game using a cursor being controlled 
entirely with neural signals.42 At Emory University, a survivor of a brain 
stem stroke43 is now able to use brain signals to spell out words and select 
phrases as a means of communication.44 Additionally, BCI has the potential 
to greatly improve the lives of patients using prosthetic limbs. Traditionally, 
using a prosthetic limb “requires training, extra effort and can have a certain 
amount of awkwardness to it.”45 However, the hope is that using BCI a 
patient can use neural signals–already associated with muscle movement in 
                                                   
40.   Morgan B. Lee et al., Brain-Computer Interfaces in Quadriplegic Patients, 30 
NEUROSURG CLIN N AM 275–81 (2019). 
41.   BrainGate is a company specializing in rehabilitative applications of BCI. The company’s 
about page explains, “Our research team includes leading neurologists, neuroscientists, engineers, 
computer scientists, neurosurgeons, mathematicians, and other researchers – all focused on developing 
brain-computer interface (BCI) technologies to restore the communication, mobility, and independence 
of people with neurologic disease, injury, or limb loss.” See BRAINGATE, 
https://www.braingate.org/about-braingate/ [https://perma.cc/QD2C-FMZB]. 
42.   Paul R. Wolpe, Ethical and Social Challenges of Brain-Computer Interfaces, 9 AM. MED. 
ASS’N J. ETHICS 128, 128 (2007).  
43.   The patient J.R. suffers from locked-in syndrome after his stroke. See id. “The locked-in 
syndrome (pseudocoma) describes patients who are awake and conscious but selectively deefferented, 
i.e., have no means of producing speech, limb or facial movements.” See 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/16186044 [https://perma.cc/K7UL-MJMC]. 
44.   Wolpe, supra note 42.  
45.  Association of Academic Physiatrists, Controlling a prosthesis with your brain, 
SCIENCEDAILY (Feb. 6, 2017), https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2017/02/170206084904.htm 


















a healthy limb—to easily control their prosthetic limb.46 This would give 
patients hands-free control of the prosthesis, a more natural and manageable 
experience.47 In order to demonstrate the full array BCI’s application to 
patient treatment, a 2018 presentation outlined the following possibilities: 
enabling quadriplegics to use BCI prosthetics, improving stroke patients’ 
motor function, providing “task-related sensations” to amputees, and 
restoring vision. 48 Clearly, these and other clinical, rehabilitative 
applications of BCI can serve to improve quality of life and care outcomes 
for patients with little other recourse. 
 
B. Commercial BCI Development 
 
Many entrepreneurs have begun to envision the potential that this 
technology holds for electively enhancing human brains. Whether they 
rationalize this as a means of keeping pace with AI or as a natural 
continuation of our evolution as a species, the reality is that the 
commercialization of these technologies as augmentative tools is very 
possible based upon existing market conditions.49 Initially, much of the 
aforementioned estimated market in 2025 is projected to be comprised of 
non-invasive BCI.50 This is unsurprising. Currently, non-invasive BCI 
devices are the only ones that are technologically viable. Further, they are 
more likely to gain initial market traction since they are less invasive and 
less permanent, making consumer comfortability more likely.51 The more 
invasive BCIs, however, if implemented, will have access to an 
unprecedented level of personally sensitive information—necessitating 
                                                   
46.   Id.  
47.   Id. Based upon the described study, researchers say that this technology is in early 
development but promised to grow rapidly. “The participant learned to activate the knee-unlocking 
switch on his prosthesis that turned on a motor and unlocked his prosthetic knee. He then proceeded to 
walk up and down parallel bars while demonstrating his ability to unlock the knee to swing his leg and 
to sit down. Throughout the study, the participant was able to successfully unlock his knee anywhere 
from 50 to 100 percent of the time, and he noted (through a questionnaire) his reactions to using BCI 
with his prosthesis.” Id.  
48.   Soc’y for Neuroscience, Brain-computer interface advances improve prosthetics, 
therapies: Advances offer help for quadriplegic, stroke, amputee, and blind patients, SCIENCEDAILY 
(Nov. 6, 2018), https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2018/11/181106121415.htm 
[https://perma.cc/L2RG-LX6K]. 
49.   Brains and Machines, supra note 22. 
50.   TRANSPARENCY MKT. RSCH., supra note 38.  
51.   Urban, supra note 22.  

















adequate privacy and security protections for consumers. 
 
II. DEVELOPMENTS IN DATA PRIVACY AND SECURITY 
 
Although technology is only now approaching neuro-implantation, 
privacy and security have been of increasing concern for decades in 
response to a variety of technological developments. As early as 1890, 
Justice Louis D. Brandeis wrote about the law’s respect for individual 
privacy—at a time when he was primarily concerned with photography and 
perceived invasions by the press:52 “If, then, the decisions indicate a general 
right to privacy for thoughts, emotions, and sensations, these should receive 
the same protection, whether expressed in writing, or in conduct, in 
conversation, in attitudes, or in facial expression.”53 Much later, the advent 
of computers and the data that they process has sparked a modern 
conversation around data privacy. Justices Warren and Brandeis’ right to 
privacy of “thoughts, emotions, and sensations” remains relevant today, 
especially in light of the potential for augmentative BCI (and the neural data 
it would no doubt collect). 
  
                                                   
52.   NEIL RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY: RETHINKING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE DIGITAL 
AGE 16–17 (2015). 
53.   Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 206 
(1890).  The Supreme Court has found the right to privacy to have a constitutional basis. See Griswold 
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (finding zones of privacy to be implied by the “penumbra” of 


















A. Non-Federal Developments 
 
1. Data Privacy 
 
The types of neural data that BCIs will collect highlight the significance 
of privacy protections. Currently, despite the growing national concern over 
privacy and security relating to technology companies,54 there is no federal 
law governing privacy standards. This poses a challenge to implementing a 
clear standard of privacy protection. While there is no current national 
framework for data privacy regulation, the California Consumer Privacy 
Act (CCPA), the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), and other 
health data regulation provide relevant examples from which to draw. The 
CCPA provides, in part, that:  
(a) A consumer shall have the right to request that a 
business that collects a consumer's personal information 
disclose to that consumer the categories and specific pieces 
of personal information the business has collected. 
(b) A business that collects a consumer's personal 
information shall, at or before the point of collection, 
inform consumers as to the categories of personal 
information to be collected and the purposes for which the 
categories of personal information shall be used. A 
business shall not collect additional categories of personal 
information or use personal information collected for 
additional purposes without providing the consumer with 
notice consistent with this section.55 
While the CCPA is regarded as the most comprehensive data law currently 
enacted in the United States, the GDPR remains the “gold standard,” 
offering the most comprehensive and all-encompassing data protection 
requirements.56 The CCPA differs from the GDPR in several ways, such as 
                                                   
54.   Kate Fazzini, In a decade of cybersecurity alarms, these are the breaches that actually 
mattered, CNBC (Dec. 23, 2019, 12:01 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/12/23/stuxnet-target-equifax-
worst-breaches-of-2010s.html [https://perma.cc/N3RN-FM9M]. 
55.   CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100 (West 2019). 
56.   DataGuidance, Comparing privacy laws: GDPR v. CCPA, FUTURE OF PRIVACY FORUM, 
https://fpf.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/GDPR_CCPA_Comparison-Guide.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5Q8Q-YFBC]. 

















the extent of its collection limitations and its accountability rules. 57 
Furthermore, the CCPA excludes medical data from its scope, deferring to 
federal health data laws, such as the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA).58 Unfortunately, HIPAA was enacted prior to 
the development of much of today’s consumer healthcare technology 
companies–leaving gaps in the regulatory framework. Concerningly, 
“Federal and state laws designed to protect [personal health information], 
such as HIPAA, are only enforced on ‘covered entities’—health care 
providers, health care plans, and research institutions.”59 These laws are not 
typically enforced on the Internet, and many private companies can solicit 
health data from users without having to conform to HIPAA regulations.” 60 
Mobile devices and health applications are a prime example of technology 
companies operating “outside the purview of HIPAA’s protections,” since 
they are not covered entities.61 
As such, existing privacy legislation tends to leave some ambiguity in 
regard to health data collected by consumer health technology companies 
through smartphone applications, wearable devices, and other non-clinical 
devices. This data, which may fall outside the purview of HIPAA, can turn 
out to be highly sensitive but lacking adequate protections. This also 
highlights the fact that sector-specific protections may be too tailored to 
anticipate future evolutions of the sector, leaving data vulnerable to hybrid 
markets, like non-clinical smartphone applications. 
  
                                                   
57.   Id. at 5.  
58.   § 1798.100, supra note 55. 
59.   See Concerns Raised About the Sharing of Health Data with Non-HIPAA Covered Entities 
via Apps and Consumer Devices, HIPAA J. (Mar. 27, 2019), https://www.hipaajournal.com/concern-
sharing-health-data-non-hipaa-covered-entities/ [https://perma.cc/UE9H-85DE].  
60.   “HIPAA was updated by the HITECH Act of 2009, which does cover electronic medical 
records and health IT, but does not extend to apps and consumer devices. GDPR covers consumer data 
collected by apps and consumer devices, but only for companies doing business with EU residents.” Id.  
61.   David M. Parker et al., Privacy and Informed Consent for Research in the Age of Big 


















2. Device Security Requirements 
 
Furthermore, there are security issues inherent in an emerging 
technology, such as BCI, that interfaces directly with individuals’ neural 
signals. Not only are the potential implications of cybersecurity failures 
quite serious in this context,62 but substantial security standards would seem 
justified because “brain data may soon give insight into what a particular 
user may be thinking or what a particular user might be experiencing.” 63 
These devices would collect, transmit, and possibly store the data in 
question, making device security vulnerabilities a very real threat to 
sensitive user data. However, there is a similar lack of federal legislation 
governing security requirements for hardware devices despite this 
increasingly apparent need for regulation.  
Connected hardware devices—from existing smart home devices to 
future BCI devices are known to be susceptible to security threats.64 This is 
in part because companies focus on making a high volume of smart, 
connected devices as cheaply as possible. Consumers want smart, 
interconnected devices that they can afford, and security may be perceived 
as not worth the expense of developing. However, this means that 
manufacturers are creating large, highly interconnected networks that could 
be vulnerable to attack without incurring significant legal liability.65 While 
                                                   
62.   See Karola V. Kreitmair, Dimensions of Ethical Direct-to-Consumer Neurotechnologies, 
10 AJOB NEUROSCIENCE 152–166, 157 (2019) (discussing cybersecurity concerns and offering as an 
example “in August 2017, the FDA recalled 465,000 implantable pacemakers, because they were 
vulnerable to hacking, allowing malicious actors the capability of delivering inappropriately paced 
shocks to the heart or rapidly draining batteries”).  
63.   Kreitmair elaborates, “Based on EEG data, scientists have been able to reconstruct images 
of faces that an individual is experiencing. With electrocorticography (ECoG), researchers have been 
able to decode the words a person is thinking to herself. Researchers have also been able to predict the 
propositional content of a thought sentence from functional neuroimaging (fMRI) data. While ECoG 
and fMRI are not functionalities of current DTC neuro-technologies, it is not clear that decoding mental 
content will always remain beyond the reach of consumer products.” Id. at 159. 
64.   See Charles T. Harry, Reminder: All those “Smart Devices are a Growing Security Threat, 
FAST COMPANY (Jan. 11, 2019), https://www.fastcompany.com/90291265/reminder-all-those-smart-
devices-are-a-growing-security-threat [https://perma.cc/VPF2-NSVK] (“These devices’ variety means 
they’re useful for lots of things, but also means they have a wide range of vulnerabilities. They 
include weak passwords, unencrypted communications and insecure web interfaces. With 
thousands, or hundreds of thousands, of identically insecure devices scattered all over the world, 
they’re a wealth of targets ripe for the hacking.”); See also Sumit Bhattacharya, The Top Ten IoT 
Vulnerabilities, INFOSEC (Feb. 17, 2018), https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/the-top-ten-iot-
vulnerabilities/ [https://perma.cc/LS59-EC5J].  
65.   Note that “These concerns are not merely speculative. By way of ‘real life’ example, 

















the risk may be negligible when applied to smart refrigerators, for example, 
it is of greater significance when applied in the context of consumer’s brains 
as “connected devices.”66 Thus far, consumer disinterest and the failure of 
regulators has enabled manufacturers to produce connected devices that are 
vulnerable to security failures. However, looking to states as “laboratories” 
of democracy,67 California has recently passed the first statute addressing 
this problem, the California IoT Law, which regulates security features of 
connected devices.68 In addition to prescribing appropriate network 
authentication features, the statute provides that the manufacturer must 
include “reasonable” security features that are: appropriate for the device’s 
nature and function; appropriate for the types of data involved; and created 
to prevent any “unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification, or 
disclosure.”69 It is provided within the same title that “’connected device’ 
means any device, or other physical object that is capable of connecting to 
the Internet, directly or indirectly, and that is assigned an Internet Protocol 
address or Bluetooth address”70  
Regarding the new statute, some have criticized its lack of specificity in 
providing concrete guidelines to manufacturers. For example, it fails to 
outline specific technical requirements that manufacturers must meet in 
order to comply. Although it does address methods for authentication via 
device passwords, it does not address other vulnerabilities of IoT devices.71 
Other weaknesses of the law include the fact that software and applications 
                                                   
beginning September 2016, massive distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks took down various US 
Internet infrastructure companies/DNS providers, leaving much of the Internet inaccessible on the east 
coast of the United States and incapacitating popular websites (including AirBnB, Amazon, Github, 
HBO, Netflix, Paypal, Reddit, the New York Times and Twitter, just to name a few). Originally created 
by three teenaged hackers, the Mirai malware responsible for the attack was specifically designed to 
target and infect susceptible IoT devices such as security cameras, home routers, air-quality monitors, 
digital video recorders and routers using a table of more than 60 common factory default usernames and 
passwords. These devices were turned into a network of remotely controlled bots that were used to 
launch the DDoS attacks which later spread globally, impacting such diverse organizations as OVH (a 
large European provider), Lonestar Cell (a Liberian Telecom Operator) and Deutsche Telekom. At its 
peak, Mirai infected over 600,000 vulnerable IoT devices.” See Lisa R. Lifshitz, Security by Design: 
California's New Iot Security Laws, BUS. L. TODAY, (Nov. 2018), at 1, 1–2. 
66.   See Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.91.05 (West 2019). 
67.   See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932).  
68.   CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.91.04 (West 2019).  
69.   Id.  
70.   Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.91.05 (West 2019). 
71.   See Jeff Kosseff, Cybersecurity of the Person, 17 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 343, 363 (2018) 
(“Although this [authentication] requirement is a good start, as security expert Robert Graham has 


















security are not included, post market security updates and upgrades are not 
regulated, and it does not provide consumers any private right of action 
against manufacturers.72 From an emerging biotech perspective, it is 
particularly noteworthy that the legislation does not apply to devices already 
covered by federal oversight such as U.S. Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) regulation.73  
The current increase of data abuse and vulnerability to hackers is likely 
to push consumers closer to the tipping point at which they demand better 
privacy and security protections for the tech devices that are now so 
integrated into their daily lives.74 This concern increases when health data, 
such as that collected by BCI devices, is being evaluated as it is even more 
sensitive than most other types of data, arguably even financial data.75 
 
B. A Federal Proposition: The Consumer Online Privacy Rights Act 
(COPRA) 
 
American consumers are increasingly distrustful of both technology 
companies and government surveillance. The percentage of Americans who 
believe that technology companies are having a positive effect has 
decreased from 71% in 2015 to 50% in 2019.76 51% believe that major 
technology companies should be more regulated than they are now.77  
 Despite the lobbying efforts of Silicon Valley technology companies, 
the Senate introduced a federal privacy bill in response to flagrant abuses of 
consumer data, responding  to the State of California’s action in passing the 
CCPA.78 Democratic Senator Maria Cantwell introduced the Consumer 
                                                   
72.   Lifshitz, supra note 65.  
73.   Lifshitz, supra note 65, at 3. 
74.   See Sarah Kellogg, Every Breath You Take: Data Privacy and Your Wearable Fitness 
Device, 72 J. MO. B. 76 (2016); Aaron Smith, Americans and Cybersecurity, PEW RSCH. CENTER: 
INTERNET, SCIENCE & TECH (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2017/01/26/americ
ans-and-cybersecurity/ [https://perma.cc/G3X5-L7VN]. 
75.    Kellogg, supra note 74, at 76 (“Health data is more vulnerable in general as a data set 
than financial data because you can't replace it like you can a credit card”).  
76.  Brooke Auxier, Monica Anderson & Madhu Kumar, 10 tech-related trends that shaped 
the decade, PEW RSCH. CENTER (Dec. 10, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2019/12/20/10-tech-related-trends-that-shaped-the-decade/ [https://perma.cc/4GGG-3XTW] (last 
visited Feb. 5, 2020) (showing a bipartisan decrease in public sentiment towards tech companies). 
77.   Id.  
78.   Tony Romm, California adopted the country’s first major consumer privacy law. Now, 
Silicon Valley is trying to rewrite it, WASH. POST (Sept. 3, 2019), 

















Online Privacy Rights Act (COPRA) on November 26, 2019, and it was 
referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation.79 As 
introduced, COPRA creates a variety of data rights for consumers including 
a right to access and transparency, a right to delete, and a right to data 
minimization.80  
Some commentators have speculated that the private right of action 
included will be a sticking point for Senate Republicans seeking to avoid 
overregulating the tech industry.81 Despite this concern for the tech industry, 
increased data security and privacy standards might actually be necessary 
to engender the consumer trust needed to allow for adoption of more 
advanced, but also invasive, technologies like BCI. This may be bolstered 
by the inclusion of a private right of action, due to consumers’ distrust of 
government or corporations to be proper stewards of their data rights. 
Furthermore, there are conflicts of interest related to law enforcement 
accessing consumer data that is collected by private technology 
companies.82 This could present a disincentive for strong government 
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[https://perma.cc/87H7-H2U9]. 
79.   Maria Cantwell, Committees - S.2968 - 116th Congress (2019-2020): Consumer Online 
Privacy Rights Act (Dec. 3, 2019), https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-
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80.   Consumer Online Privacy Rights Act, S.2968, 116th Cong. (2019). This bill fizzled out 
by the end of Summer 2020 as COVID-19 legislation preoccupied legislator’s efforts. However, the 
need for federal privacy policy continues, as evidenced by the September 2020 Senate Commerce 
Committee hearing “Revisiting the Need for Privacy Legislation.” Before the hearing, Republicans 
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Chin, How the 2020 elections will shape the federal privacy debate, BROOKINGS (Oct. 26, 2020), 
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81.   Cat Zakrzewski, The Technology 202: Top Senate Democrat’s new privacy bill likely to 
spark GOP protests, WASH. POST (Nov. 26, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/
paloma/the-technology-202/2019/11/26/the-technology-202-top-senate-democrat-s-new-privacy-bill-
likely-to-spark-gop-protests/5ddc3680602ff1181f2640e3/ [https://perma.cc/U59E-UVPY]. 
82.   E.g. Kashmir Hill & Heather Murphy, Your DNA Profile is Private? A Florida Judge Just 
Said Otherwise, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/05/business/dna-
database-search-warrant.html [https://perma.cc/P69R-53D3]; Jack Nicas & Katie Benner, F.B.I. Asks 




















enforcement of any violations of the COPRA. Senator Cantwell has 
defended the inclusion of a private right of action against companies large 
enough to outmaneuver bureaucratic agencies.83 She said “‘There’s nothing 
like the CFO, CEO and the general counsel getting in a room and going, 
‘You know, we could be sued for this…Guess what that changes? 
Behavior.’”84 
In regard to device security, Section 107, which covers the Right to Data 
Security is somewhat ambiguous as to when in the data lifecycle the right 
begins to apply.85 This leaves open the question of device security standards 
that may be required. If the trend of technology becoming increasingly 
integrated in the daily lives of Americans and devices becoming 
increasingly invasive continues, then there is a strong case to be made that 
federal law should not only protect data privacy with a private right of action 
but also take measures to protect device security as well. 
 
III. CONSIDERATIONS FOR FUTURE DATA PRIVACY AND 
SECURITY POLICY 
 
Although it can be difficult for most consumers to establish harm 
sufficient to gain standing in data breach cases, it would be naïve to discount 
the value of adequate data privacy and security.86 As society continues to 
navigate the emerging Information Age, it is clear that data has immense 
value, but it is yet to be determined whether consumers should have any 
rights to that value. Additionally, as data becomes more personal and 
invasive, it also becomes immutable and thus more concerning when 
compromised. While a new credit card number can be issued, a new 
genomic sequence cannot.87 Furthermore, invasive devices and highly 
personal data present serious opportunities for exploitation from both 
                                                   
83.   Tony Romm, Top Senate Democrats unveil new online privacy bill, promising tough 
penalties for data abuse, WASH. POST (Nov. 26, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/
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governmental action for surveillance purposes and private action for profit 
to name a few.88 Although a full analysis of the risks associated with a 
largely unprotected invasive data profile of an individual consumer is 
beyond the scope of this paper, the lack of significant individual harm from 
data breaches thus far is not representative of potential harms going forward. 
As such, it is prudent to lay the groundwork with the law today to respect 
an individual’s rights in regard to data privacy and device security. 
 
A. Augmentative BCI is Part of a Larger Trend Towards Invasive 
Technology  
 
From basic recordings of search history on Google to more sensitive 
recordings of an individual’s location, heart rate and activity levels to their 
exact genomic code, there’s no question that advances in technology mean 
that the types of data collected become increasingly personal. However, the 
potential adoption of augmentative BCI takes this trend to an unprecedented 
level. Although data privacy and security issues were pushed aside when 
dealing with personal computers, cell phones, and in-home smart devices, 
they could become much more serious threats. As such, policymakers must 
be considering early-stage technologies like BCI and others that could be 
even more invasive when crafting solutions to these issues. Based upon 
existing scholarship and bipartisan support for a federal privacy statute, this 
paper focuses upon elements that should be incorporated into a federal data 
privacy and device security policy, treating arguments regarding the need 
for such legislation as beyond its scope.89 This section will focus on the need 
for a federal statute with a broad scope, sufficient enforcement mechanisms, 
an incorporation of device security standards, and prohibitions as needed 
while comparing these mandates with the existing proposal seen in COPRA. 
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B. More Comprehensive Data Privacy and Security is Needed for the 
Information Age  
 
Currently, there is not a sufficiently comprehensive policy framework 
in the United States to govern the issues of privacy and security for 
emerging technologies. This is certainly true when considering the highly 
invasive nature of BCIs which interface directly with users’ brains, 
collecting data about an individual’s neural signals, thoughts, and 
emotions.90 It seems obvious that widespread adoption of this technology 
could have significant societal implications. The risks and benefits of that 
adoption will likely be varied (and to some degree unanticipated) but will 
certainly include the collection and processing of data of an unprecedented 
degree of sensitivity. The fact that technology is being developed to work 
with such invasive data highlights the need for a data privacy and security 
policy that not only deals with today’s data abuses but also seeks to 
anticipate the protection of consumers’ most personal data as the 
Information Age progresses. 
 
1. The Scope Should Allow for Dynamic Regulation 
 
Technology in the Information Age is known to advance rapidly and 
present new challenges for lawmakers.91 These challenges are especially 
salient given the drastic differential in economic power and technical 
knowledge between large technology companies and individual users.92 
Because potential abuses are varied and likely to continue evolving rapidly, 
any federal statute should be sufficiently broad to allow for dynamic 
regulation through agency guidance and caselaw development.93 This 
regulatory power should be granted to either an existing agency or to a new 
agency created specifically for the purpose of governing data privacy and 
cybersecurity. Doing so will create a more dynamic regulatory environment 
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that will allow the law to better adapt and tackle new threats to data privacy 
and security as they arise. Criticisms of a broad regulation of data privacy 
have been advanced, namely in response to the GDPR. These criticisms 
often lament the increased costs to businesses, express concern for the 
tradition of “free and open exchange of information” on the Internet, and 
suggest that regulating this exchange might lead to less innovative 
technology.94 Although these concerns are legitimate and an appropriate 
balance will need to be struck, there is currently a much greater risk from a 
total lack of regulation.95 Furthermore, broad legislation with dynamic 
regulatory guidance will allow companies to look to agency 
recommendations for clarity and guidance in developing and maintaining 
proper privacy and security for new innovations. This may help to mitigate 
any worry about legislative changes which could negate the viability of 
technologies that companies have invested significant amounts of capital in 
developing. Allowing protections to develop through caselaw and under 
iterative regulatory guidance can help to lessen any potential drag on 
innovation and increase compliance. It will also help to better protect 
consumers’ privacy security by lessening the likelihood of powerful 
technology companies finding work arounds for static prohibitions.  
COPRA is a strong step in the right direction; however, it is somewhat 
limited because it primarily seeks to protect data by placing limitations upon 
known abuses. For example, the right to data security seems meant to 
address data breaches96 and the right to access and transparency seems to 
seek to ensure that consumers are operating with more complete information 
about their data and how it is being used.97 This format is limited by its 
enumeration of specific rights, in an attempt to prevent already known 
abuses, and by its assignment of enforcement responsibility to consumers.98 
The average consumer does not have the time or inclination to download, 
                                                   
94.   See Adam Satariano, Europe Is Reining In Tech Giants. But Some Say It’s Going Too 
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read, verify, and monitor how every data point is being used. Companies 
should not be able to misuse increasingly sensitive data merely due to a lack 
of consumer oversight. One example of a more broadly-written provision is 
the duty of loyalty that COPRA places on covered entities prohibiting 
deceptive or harmful data practices or any other violation of the Act.99 A 
statute written with more emphasis on broader affirmative duties for 
companies or general prohibitions to be fleshed out by regulators could be 
more effective in providing a framework for adaptable, relevant data 
privacy and security policy moving forward. 
Importantly, COPRA provides for the establishment of a new Bureau 
within the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) for addressing “privacy, data 
security, and related issues.”100 This is a great strength of the legislation and 
should allow for more dynamic regulation in a rapidly evolving space. 
Additionally, this unnamed Bureau will be able to develop some expertise 
in data and technology in order to work with the industry to offer guidance 
moving forward, which is likely to improve compliance and the 
development of sustainable regulation that does not stifle innovation.101 
 
2. Sufficient Enforcement Mechanisms Necessary 
 
In order to have the intended impact, any legislation should have 
adequate mechanisms for enforcement. This should include a private right 
of action in order to incentivize compliance by corporate entities without 
requiring consumers to rely entirely upon regulatory enforcement. This is 
due to the frequency with which powerful companies have been able to 
maneuver around bureaucratic enforcement102 and because there are 
instances where the government has an interest in a company 
“compromising” its privacy standards to some degree.103 The latter is likely 
more of a constitutional issue which is beyond the scope of this Note but 
will need to be worked out by the courts and by policymakers. However, 
this concern still supports extending a private right of action to consumers. 
A private right alone, however, could be insufficient due to the power 
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differential between consumers and large technology companies which 
makes some private claims impracticable due to their cost.  Further, most 
consumers lack the requisite amount of time and technical expertise to 
monitor companies’ data practices.104 As such, enforcement authority 
should be vested in either an existing regulatory agency or a new agency 
created for the express purpose of governing data privacy and cybersecurity. 
Additionally, State Attorneys General should have the power to enforce the 
legislations requirements through some cause of action as well.  
Because COPRA provides for the formation of a Bureau to aid in 
enforcement as well as for civil enforcement, it includes a sufficient degree 
of governmental enforcement.105 Furthermore, it allows for private rights of 
action in violations of certain provisions.106 Therefore, the bill includes both 
public and private mechanisms, a key element of a strong data privacy and 
device security policy. 
 
3. Device Security Standards 
 
Device security is an integral component of the safety and privacy of 
users. As such, a federally mandated standard of requisite device security 
should be incorporated into the legislation.107 Unlike the California IoT 
Law, federal standards should be specific enough to allow the private right 
of action mentioned above to apply.108 The difficulty of proving damages in 
a case of failure to comply with security standards is likely to provide an 
adequate check to prevent this cause of action from being used excessively 
by plaintiffs, although this would be decided to some degree by the courts.109 
Furthermore, the standards should remain sufficiently broad to allow for 
rapid updates in industry cybersecurity standards. Once again, the proper 
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agency should be able to further regulate these standards.  
COPRA is focused mainly on companies collecting and processing 
data. The bill does provide for a right to data security but does not include 
device security measures.110 Because COPRA solely focuses on actions 
taken by companies to ensure the integrity of the data that they may store 
and process, it overlooks device security, which is often the initial point of 
data collection.111 Although this point in the life cycle is most vulnerable to 
malicious third parties, companies should still bear some responsibility for 
ensuring adequate security at this phase if they will be collecting highly 
sensitive data from consumers. This continuing gap in the safety and 
integrity of consumer technology should either be addressed by the FTC 
Bureau that is created or ideally, referenced more explicitly in the bill. 
Device security is a crucial first step in the collection of consumer data and 
thus too important to data privacy and consumer protection to be excluded 
from the policy. While the California IoT Law could be used as a starting 
point for this inclusion, mandating security updates and providing some 
guidelines for software and applications security would also be important 
when ensuring the security of consumer technology devices and the data 
that they could collect.112 
 
4. Highly Sensitive or Invasive Data Points 
 
There are serious technical limitations to permanent deletion of data. 
This is due in part to cloud storage, the scale of server storage, and a general 
lack of clarity surrounding permanent deletion.113 Although not 
insurmountable, ensuring full deletion is not always economically feasible. 
Some companies even create carve-outs in the data destruction section of 
their Non-Disclosure Agreements to allow for retention of data that has been 
backed up to its servers for this reason.114 Because of this and the relative 
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inability of the average consumer to verify that all traces of his or her data 
have indeed been deleted, there may be some types of data that merit total 
protection from ever being collected in the first place.115  
 It is likely that as devices become more invasive and the data collected 
becomes increasingly sensitive, there could be a threshold at which it may 
be necessary to completely ban the collection of said data types. Other 
protections such as notice and control will simply be insufficient due to the 
high potential for abuse, which at a certain point will outweigh any 
legitimate business uses such as research and development, enhancing user 
experience, etc. The policy should allow for this power subject to serious 
inquiry and at the discretion of the agency charged with data privacy and 
security. If compliance is a serious concern, criminal sanctions may be 
appropriate to include as well. 
Although COPRA includes a right to data minimization, a right to 
deletion, and limits upon the processing and transfer of certain data points 
relating to an individual’s civil rights, it fails to provide any option for more 
comprehensive restrictions upon companies, barring the collection of 
certain data types.116 While this is unsurprising as the bill was likely written 
with modern technology companies in mind, it should still allow for the 
possibility that the FTC Bureau charged with this issue may see fit in the 
future to disallow any collection. For the aforementioned reasons, a right to 
deletion may not always be sufficient protection for highly sensitive data 
such that may be collected by invasive technologies like BCI. 
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C. Balancing with Commercial Interests and Technological 
Innovation 
 
As discussed, there are legitimate concerns regarding the establishment 
of a strong federal policy regulating technology companies which could 
potentially inhibit innovation and future growth in a critical sector.117 
Additionally, many technology companies use much of the wealth that they 
collect in consumer data to tweak their applications in order to offer an 
enhanced user experience, making the technology more valuable to 
consumers and to society. Without the ability to collect and analyze data, 
technological development may be hampered.118 These are legitimate 
concerns and it would be advisable for the FTC Bureau charged with 
regulating data privacy and security to balance these concerns with those of 
consumer protection and the integrity of the data privacy framework. There 
may eventually need to be a classification system or some other means of 
distinguishing between less sensitive consumer data and highly invasive 
consumer data, each of which would obviously weigh differently against 
the interests of businesses and innovation.119  
Many of the more stringent elements suggested here are defensible in 
relation to a technology as invasive as BCI but could be considered over-
regulation for some less invasive types of technology. However, it would be 
inappropriate to rely upon sector-specific legislation (such as HIPAA) to 
regulate invasive biotechnology data. This is because of the potential for 
abuse as seen in emerging consumer health companies often falling outside 
of relevant HIPAA restrictions.120 Overall, it is important to have a dynamic 
policy shaped by agency guidance and rulemaking as discussed above in 
order to quickly adjust to evolving threats posed by rapidly changing 
technology. 
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BCI is an emerging biotechnology that could allow elective brain 
augmentation. This is an extreme but logical extension of the existing trend 
towards invasive consumer technology products. From stationary desktop 
computers to portable laptops to smart phones which have essentially 
become fifth limbs for many of today’s consumers121 to the Internet of 
Things (IoT) devices that are becoming increasingly prevalent in homes 
(e.g., Alexa, Nest, smart refrigerators, doorbell cameras, etc.), connected 
devices—and the data that they collect—are becoming integrated into more 
and more aspects of consumers’ daily lives.  
The data privacy and security concerns that accompany these devices 
are significantly greater if consumers are willing to adopt invasive BCI for 
augmentative purposes as some technology companies are hoping. The need 
for adequate data privacy protection will become highly relevant as these 
BCI devices will be collecting data on consumers’ neural signals – gleaning 
access to their most private thoughts and fleeting emotions.122 Even if BCI 
does not attain widespread adoption, the overall trend towards invasive 
technology collecting increasingly personal data means that Congress 
should be intentional about crafting federal privacy and security legislation 
that is equipped to handle these challenges moving forward rather than 
merely addressing privacy abuses that have been seen thus far. The rapid 
pace of technology development and high potential for consumer abuse and 
infringements upon privacy for surveillance purposes necessitate it.123  
Establishing a dynamic framework for federal data privacy and device 
security policy is an important first step in equipping the law to handle the 
technological developments yet to come. Key elements of this include a 
broad statute that adequately equips an agency to develop adaptable 
regulations, sufficient enforcement mechanisms to promote compliance, 
incorporation of device security standards in order to ensure data safety 
from the initial point of collection, and an allowance for possible prohibition 
of collecting certain data types due to the realities of digital storage. COPRA 
recognizes some of these elements but falls short when it comes to others. 
It rightly provides for the establishment of a new Bureau within the FTC to 
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handle data privacy and related matters.124 This will allow for more dynamic 
regulation and more attentive enforcement. However, the rights provided 
for in the bill seem to be primarily based upon data privacy abuses that have 
already been discovered without offering adequate breadth to allow the new 
Bureau to quickly adapt to emerging issues with newer technology and data 
types.125  
In regard to enforcement mechanisms, COPRA seems to provide for 
sufficient enforcement to encourage compliance, ideally without 
overburdening technology companies. COPRA does not offer any guidance 
on device security or allow for special treatment (such as prohibiting 
collection) of overly invasive data types that may be seen in the future.126 
As such, COPRA is an important step towards a federal framework for data 
privacy but fails to adequately anticipate the future likelihood of 
increasingly invasive consumer technology. Laying a broad and iterative 
regulatory framework in the near-term will allow policymakers to better 
handle the rapid developments of invasive consumer technologies over the 
long-term. Therefore, the legislative elements proposed in this paper for 
addressing the concerns presented by BCI are by no means comprehensive 
but should nevertheless be seriously considered as components of a truly 
forward-looking data privacy and device security policy equipped to handle 
the development of BCI and beyond.
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